Welfare and Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing:
INTRODUCTION
The causes, consequences, and cures of teenage out-of-wedlock childbearing have received sustained attention from the public at large, public policymakers, advocacy groups, and social policy analysts. While there may be consensus that the consequences are generally undesirable for mother and child and that reducing the number of out-of-wedlock births is an important policy goal, uncertainty and controversy dominate discussions of the major causes and the most promising and appropriate remedies.
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between welfare benefits and teenage out-of-wedlock childbearing, a topic of perennial controversy. It uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to follow the fertility and marital history of young girls from 1979 to 1984. The data capture fairly recent behavior, while other research on this topic relies on data from the mid-1970s or earlier.
The analysis merges the personal and family background characteristics in the NLSY with state data on welfare policy. It uses logit crosssection and discrete hazard models to explore the impact of welfare policy variables on the probability that a girl will give birth out of wedlock.
Section 1 briefly reviews the literature on welfare and out-of-wedlock childbearing. Section 2 discusses the model, data, and methods. The findings are in section 3. Contrary to those in other recent work, they suggest that state welfare policy is related to out-of-wedlock childbearing by blacks and whites. The fourth section offers a tentative reconciliation of these divergent findings and provides illustrative calculations of the effects of significant variables.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON WELFARE AND OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING
As Moore and Burt (1982) and others have observed, a young girl's route from virginity to bearing a child out of wedlock involves a sequence of choices, which may be implicit or explicit, active or passive :
Whether to initiate (and continue) sexual intercourse;
Whether to practice contraception and, if so, choice of method and diligence in using it;
Whether to carry a pregnancy to term, abort it, marry the father where this is a viable option, place the child for adoption, or raise it as an unmarried mother.
The literature has examined determinants of each of these choices. 1 The decisions to initiate sexual activity and use contraceptives have been extensively analyzed. Factors directly associated with bearing a child when unmarried have, surprisingly, received relatively less attention despite the wide interest in this way of resolving a pregnancy. There are only eleven microdata-based studies which analyze the outcome of having a child out of ~e d l o c k .~ It seems highly unlikely that welfare would affect decisions about initiating sexual activity. And, given what is known about determinants of contraceptive use by adolescents, it is rather unlikely that welfare would influence this decision either. There is, in any case, no evidence in the literature that welfare affects these decisions.
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The eleven microdata-based studies in which having a child when unmarried is a dependent variable follow two general empirical modeling approaches. One examines the pregnancy resolution decisions of unmarried women, conditional on their being pregnant. Six studies take this approach. Of these, only Moore and Caldwell (1977) includes welfare variables among the explanatory factors. The second adopts a reduced-form model by examining factors associated with out-of-wedlock childbearing among all women in the sample regardless of their pregnancy status. Five microdata studies take this second approach.4 And of them, only Ellwood and Bane (1985) and Moore (1980) This necessarily implies a greater likelihood of either marriage or premarital motherhood. However, the regressions do not yield statistically significant effects of benefits on either of these outcomes considered singly. Moreover, the acceptance rate (ratio of applications accepted for AFDC to all AFDC applications) has a significant negative impact on out-of-wedlock childbearing, which theory would not predict. The authors view the overall set of findings as not supporting the contention that more generous welfare programs induce premarital childbearing. The study also finds that the presence of an AFDC-UP program is associated with fewer premarital births, as one would expect, since this program allows young couples to marry without automatic disqualification from AFDC payments.
Among the reduced-form analyses, Ellwood and Bane's widely cited study using data from 1976 reports no relationship between AFDC benefits and out-of-wedlock childbearing among blacks or whites in several age groups. This study relies on one basic measure of welfare policy, the AFDC guarantee. Moore (1980) uses the same data base to explore the effect of a large variety of welfare and other policy variables on white, black, and Hispanic teenage out-of-wedlock childbearing. Of fourteen models that considered a measure of welfare benefits, just one found a significant effect in the plausible positive direction. Two found puzzling significant negative effects, while eleven found no significant effect. Among blacks, out-of-wedlock childbearing was significantly higher in states where the income of the mother's parents is not considered in determining the mother's and infant's eligibility for A m C . Here the acceptance rate was unrelated to out-of-wedlock childbearing, as were several other measures of welfare administrative policies. The weight of the evidence from both studies implies that more liberal welfare benefits and policies do not provide detectable incentives for out-of-wedlock childbearing.
A number of studies using aggregate data on state or SMSA birthrates out of wedlock have also examined welfare effect^.^ With the exception of Janowitz (1976) , none finds evidence of a positive association between more liberal welfare policies and premarital births.
Thus, such studies are consistent with the message from the analyses of microdata.
MODEL AND EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES
This study adopts the reduced-form approach by focusing on the determinants of births while unmarried among all teenage girls in the sample, not just those who become pregnant. It models the likelihood of such a birth as a function of welfare policy, controlling for family background and personal variables. Some variables may affect the likelihood primarily by influencing, for example, age at first intercourse, while others may matter because they primarily influence 
where Pi is the probability and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables. Because the panel nature of the NLSY permits it, the study also uses a discrete-time hazard-rate model. The model analyzes the conditional probability that a birth out of wedlock will occur at time t to girl i, given that it has not already occurred. The discrete-time hazard rate is
where T is the discrete random variable giving the uncensored time of a birth out of wedlock and sit is a vector of explanatory variables. I adopt a standard logistic parameterization of the hazard rate:
To test for duration dependence I enter separate dummies for each year of age beyond 15, the first age at which a girl appears in the sample.12 A standard logit program estimates the coefficients using data for all years a girl is in the sample, up to and including the year in which a premarital birth occurs or she is censored.13
Censoring occurs for three reasons. Most often the girl neither marries nor gives birth out of wedlock by 1984, the last year in the data set. Attrition from the NLSY creates some censoring.14 Third, if a girl marries in year t, I treat years t+l through 1984 as censored.
The logistic hazard-rate model has an advantage over the standard cross-section probability models that have been used in other analyses. 
Specification
The study examines the effects of five indicators of state welfare policy. The first and principal one is the cash AFDC guarantee for a family of four plus the amount of food stamps the family would receive if its only income was the cash guarantee. Standard incentive arguments imply a positive coefficient for this AFDC plus food stamp guarantee, though earlier work suggests it may not be statistically significant.
The second is an index of the stringency of eligibility conditions.
Since higher values of the index imply more difficulty in qualifying for AFDC, one would expect this variable to be negatively related to out-of-wedlock childbearing. Third is a dummy for the presence of the AFDC-UP program, which reduces the marginal benefit of raising a child born out of wedlock relative to marrying the father and, thus, would tend to encourage pregnant teenagers to marry the fathers (and vice versa). Hence, theory suggests this variable should have a negative coefficient as well.
Fourth is an index of the availability of welfare benefits to pregnant women before their children are born, scaled so that higher values signify less availability. Since a higher value implies that a teenager faces a less generous welfare program, holding benefit levels constant, one expects a negative relation with premarital childbearing.
The last indicator of welfare policy is an index of requirements of AFDC recipients, based on rules about participation in work and rehabilitation programs and assisting in locating absent fathers.
Higher values signify more required participation in such activities and a less attractive welfare system, other things equal. Hence, this index would also be expected to have a negative coefficient.
Besides the welfare policy variables, all models include as controls five family background and personal variables that earlier research has suggested are important determinants of out-of-wedlock childbearing. These are mother's education, presence of welfare income in the girl's family in 1978, family income, family structure at age 14, and religiosity. The welfare and family income variables are measured at age 14, which is prior to any premarital birth and, hence, exogenous to it. Family structure is indicated by dummy variables for families with a mother as the only adult present, a mother and stepfather present, or a residual "other" category. The omitted category is a family with both natural parents present. Religiosity is indicated by a series of dummies for the frequency of attendance at religious services. Table 1 contains the logit findings for all five welfare policy variables, controlling for family background factors. One message that clearly emerges is that the effects of welfare markedly differ for Hispanics, blacks, and whites. The lack of common significant policy variables across the groups is surprising.
FINDINGS

Effects of Welfare Policy Variables
For Hispanics, none of the five are significant. This may result from the small sample and relatively high correlations among some of the welfare variables. For blacks, similar trials yielded the same conclusion about the insignificance of the welfare guarantee, while the significant effects of the AFDC-UP and eligibility-stringency variables consistently appeared.
For whites, the significant association between the welfare guarantee and births out of wedlock was robust under nearly all variations. Only when the AFDC cash guarantee plus food stamps plus insurance value of Medicaid was used did the coefficient become insignificant. 16 Discrete-time hazard-rate models which replicate the specifications in Table 1 appear in Table 2 . The only variables added to the specification are age dummies to examine the time pattern of out-of-wedlock childbearing, holding other things constant. Since the results for the coefficients on the family background variables are similar to those in Table 1 , they do not appear, though they were included in the models.
For whites the hazard and cross-section results generally agree.
The AFDC-food stamp guarantee and the requirements index remain significantly associated with out-of-wedlock childbearing in the hazard model. When region variables are added, again the guarantee remains significant but the requirements index does not. The hazard estimate yields a significantly positive coefficient on the pregnancy-benefits index. This is contrary to expectation, since it indicates that the less available are these benefits the more likely is a premarital pregnancy, and presents a puzzle without clear explanation.
For blacks the eligibility-stringency index is again significant in the expected negative direction, though the size of the coefficient is much smaller. The AFDC-UP dummy is no longer associated with out-of-wedlock childbearing. The other three welfare variables are insignificant in both tables. The addition of region dummies does not change the results for the eligibility or AFDC-UP variables, but the * = significant at lo%, ** = significant at 5% *** = significant at 1%. requirements index then becomes significant with the expected negative coefficient .
All welfare variables were insignificant in the Hispanic logit model. The Hispanic hazard estimates are similar, except that the eligibility index is significant and, contrary to expectation, positive. This, too, is a puzzling result with no obvious explanation.
One may reasonably infer from the totality of the empirical results that welfare policy was related to out-of-wedlock childbearing by black and white adolescents during the early 1980s. The lack of common significant policy variables across the groups is surprising. Perhaps different attributes of AFDC do affect blacks and whites differently, but it is more likely that the correlation among program attributes makes it difficult to pin down the exact source of the effect. And it is certainly possible that individuals are not responding to any one attribute in particular, but instead to their general perceptions of the benefits and restrictiveness of the program in their area. It would, then, be unwise to draw conclusions or recommendations that hinge on the precise magnitudes of those coefficients which pass significance tests.
The overall impression, however, is that there is a link between more generous, less restrictive welfare programs and greater out-of-wedlock childbearing.
Family Background Effects
Though effects of family background variables are not the focus of this study, they merit brief discussion. As for the welfare variables, these effects markedly differ among Hispanics, blacks, and whites. For each group the directions of impact of those variables that proved significant are in the anticipated directions. Again, the lack of common significant family background variables across the three groups is surprising.
Mother's education is a significant determinant of out-of-wedlock childbearing only for whites and has the predicted negative coefficient.
The coefficient is also negative for Hispanics and blacks, but fails a 10 percent t-test. Family income has a significant negative effect on black girls' premarital childbearing, and the presence of welfare income has a significant positive effect. Neither appears to affect Hispanics and whites.
The coefficients on the dummy variables for family structure at age 14 indicate the impact of each structure relative to the omitted category of living in a family with both natural parents present.
Positive effects would be consistent with expectations. One variable is significant for each group, but it is a different one for each. For Other studies provide strong empirical evidence that welfare affects other demographic choices such as divorce, remarriage, and choice of living arrangement by female heads of families, but fail to find a link between welfare and out-of-wedlock childbearing. Ellwood and Bane (1985) reconcile the body of evidence by suggesting that, the greater the long-run consequences of a demographic decision, the weaker the effects of financial incentives such as those created by welfare.
Thus, finding no effect of welfare on out-of-wedlock childbearing, an event with profound long-run consequences, is not inconsistent with finding significant effects of welfare on the other behaviors.
Why does this study find significant effects of the welfare guarantee for whites whereas others do not? While one can always attribute these results to differences in sample, variable construction, and estimation methods, a tentative alternative explanation is also available. One can plausibly argue that by the 1980s the stigma associated with bearing a child out of wedlock and the broad social controls that inhibited out-of-wedlock childbearing had declined relative to their strength in prior years.19 In earlier years these psychological controls may have sufficiently damped down potential responses to the economic incentives of welfare to make these responses too small to achieve statistical (or substantive) significance. If psychological constraints on behavior have weakened in more recent years, economic incentives would have greater influence on behavior. Now, the findings of no impact of welfare benefits in Ellwood and Bane's (1985) influential study, in Moore (1980) , Moore and Caldwell (1977) , and studies that used aggregate-level data, are all based on data from the mid-1970s or earlier. The results reported here, based on data covering 1979 to 1984, could reflect a shift in behavior resulting in greater sensitivity to financial incentives if the above-hypothesized change in the social environment had o~curred.~'
The finding that black out-of-wedlock childbearing is lower in states with the AFDC-UP program is consistent with Moore and Caldwell (1977) , the only other microdata study that included this policy variable.21 The significant impact of the eligibility-stringency index in the expected direction conflicts with their and Moore's (1980) findings for a similar administrative variable, the AFDC acceptance rate.
Illustrative Calculations of Effects of Significant Variables
Since logistic estimates are difficult to interpret directly, Table   3 illustrates the impact of changes in significant welfare policy variables on the probability that a girl would give birth out of wedlock by age 19. As observed earlier, it would be misguided to draw strong conclusions or policy recommendations that hinge on the precise results .004
Welfare guarantee -$600
.021
Recipient requirement index -.1
.013
Recipient requirement index -.5
.004 or black case, mother' s education = 11 years, two-parent family, no welfare income, attends religious services frequently, family income = $13,000, guarantee = $500, eligibility index -.68, AFDC-UP dummy = 0 (no program), pregnancy benefit index -3.2, and recipient requirements index = 0.3. For white case, identical values, except mother's education = 12 years and family income = $24,000. b~o r black case, mother-stepfather family, had welfare income, income = $8,000. For white case, mother's education = 8 years, "other" family, had welfare income. Other variables' values same as base cases.
of t h i s s o r t of e x e r c i s e . R e s u l t s a r e based on t h e e s t i m a t e s i n Table 1 and, s i n c e no p o l i c y v a r i a b l e s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t f o r Hispanics, appear only f o r b l a c k s and w h i t e s . 
h a t t h e p r e d i c t e d b l a c k p r o b a b i l i t y i n s t a t e s with an AFDC-UP program i s about h a l f t h e l e v e l i n s t a t e s without i t . Note i n rows 4a and 4b
t h e r a t h e r l a r g e r e l a t i v e impacts on whites of a $100 change i n t h e w e l f a r e guarantee from t h e base value of $ 5 0 0 .~~ Changes i n t h e r e c i p i e n t requirements index e x e r t smaller impacts.
The remainder of Table 3 ''This means that any major differences between the logit and hazard results will not possibly be due to differences in distributional assumptions. Comparing logit and hazard results will indicate how sensitive the main findings are to choice of estimation method.
12For girls who were 15 in 1979, all six years of data are used.
For girls who were 14 in 1979, I omit the data for 1979. By doing so I implicitly assume that the risk of having a child out of wedlock begins for all girls at age 15. (Only 4 of the 446 14-year-olds in the sample gave birth out of wedlock in 1979.)
13see Allison (1982) for further discussion of discrete-time hazard models.
14~ttrition is very low, so assuming that attrition does not bias the estimates appears reasonable.
151f persons never left their initial state of residence, measurement of welfare policy variables might not be badly distorted, since such variables tend to be highly correlated over time. But interstate migration will create measurement error in a cross-section study.
16~xtending the control variables to include measures of self-esteem, self-control, attitudes towards school and work, educational expectations, and academic ability/achievement (as assessed by the AFQT score) did not change the findings on any of the welfare policy measures. Complete results from this specification are available upon request.
17~he only notable differences between the hazard-rate results on these control variables and those in Table 1 are that for blacks, the dummy on mother-stepfather becomes insignificant and one of the religious-attendance dummies becomes significant. As for the age dummies, none is significant for Hispanics. For blacks, age bears a strong relation to the chances of premarital childbearing. Other things equal, the likelihood of a birth rises steadily from age 15 to a peak at 18, then declines monotonically to age 20. For whites, too, age is associated with premarital childbearing, but the pattern is not as sharp as for blacks. The hazard rate tends to increase with age and is highest at age 20. Full results are available upon request.
he experience of Hispanics of Cuban origin differs from that of other Hispanics along several socioeconomic dimensions. In this sample there were 11 Cubans. None had an out-of-wedlock birth. With a maximum likelihood method such as logit, adding a dummy for a variable in which one of the two outcomes has no observations would cause the estimation method to fail, so no Cuban dummy was tried.
19~or example, Zelnik, Kantner, and Ford (1981: 48) show that between 1971 and 1976 there was a clear decline in the proportion of respondents who believed society and their neighborhoods would strongly or very strongly condemn unwed motherhood. See also evidence cited in Ellwood (1988: 63) .
'O~brahamse, Morrison and Waite (1988) and Hanson, Myers, and Ginsburg (1987) also examine data from the early 1980s but do not include welfare policy variables. Causality may go the other way, too:
increased out-of-wedlock childbearing may have led people to revise their views on the acceptability of such behavior so that it creates less stigma than it once did.
o ow ever , they did not find a significant impact of AFDC-UP in their analysis of aggregate state data.
2 2~n absolute terms the differences are small, but observe that the ratio of the probability when the guarantee equals $600 ($400) to the base case probability is 2.33 (.44).
